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For the last two decades, corporate governance has been on the forefront of policy debates 
(OECD, 2015). Essentially, it relates to the mechanisms, processes, and relations by which 
corporations are controlled and directed. Corporate governance not only encompasses the 
relationships and ensuing patterns of behaviour between different agents in a limited liability 
corporation, but also requires the assistance of public policy in the form of periodic regulatory 
intervention; since ultimately all corporate strategies have to be formulated within a legal and 
regulatory framework. 
In their seminal study, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that – “understanding the subject 
of corporate governance improvements is of enormous practical value in transition economies, 
which will stimulate governance reform for better economy”. In this paper, we re-evaluate the 
competing views of internal capital markets (ICMs) in an emerging economy. We use a major 
corporate governance reform in China as an exogenous shock to examine its impact on changes in 
merger-related value creation for ICMs among Chinese listed firms. In particular, Allen et al. 
(2005) show that Chinese laws for investor protection, financial system and corporate governance 
mechanism are significantly inferior to most developed countries. Traditionally, besides tradable 
shares (mainly classified as A-shares), firm ownership structure in China was comprised of non-
tradable shares classified as state shares and/or legal person shares. Until the beginning of 2005, 
around two-third of the outstanding shares were non-tradable in China. Moreover, the majority of 
listed firms in China are carve-outs from large State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) under the control 
of the Chinese government or its agencies at central and local/provincial level (Li et al., 2011; Liao 
et al., 2014). On Sept. 4th, 2005, China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) announced a 
market wide non-tradable share reform plan after successfully piloting a first batch of three 
companies on May 9th, 2005 and a second batch of 42 companies on June 20th, 2005. This Split-
Share Structure Reform granted legitimate trading rights to the state-owned shares of listed SOEs 
with a compensation paid by non-tradable shareholders to tradable shareholders, thereby opening 
up the gate to China's secondary privatization (Firth et al., 2010, Li et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2014). 
Overtime, the reform has been well justified as an exogenous shock which led to risk sharing 
between minority and controlling shareholders (Li et al., 2011), performance improvement 
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(Campello et al., 2014；Liao et al., 2014; Hou et al., 2015),1 reduced tunneling activities (Liu and 
Tian, 2012), changes in earnings management and tax avoidance activities (Hou et al., 2015).  
The above literature generally examines the impact of the Split-Share Structure Reform on 
firms, and in comparison, very limited attention has been paid to its consequences on business 
transactions. Business groups and related-party networks in China not only internalize goods and 
service transactions, but also capital transactions. Therefore, M&A decisions can be a vital capital 
resource allocation mechanism within ICMs (Chen et al., 2007). In light of extensive evidence 
documented in the prior literature on corporate governance and takeover outcome, we believe that 
M&As are ideally suited in the context of our study on value gains from ICMs following a major 
regulatory reform. As per the basic statistics from our data for the Chinese M&A market, related-
party M&A deals account for almost 45% of total deal volumes, simultaneously accounting for 
over one-third of the total transaction value even in the post-Split-Share Structure Reform period.2 
However, so far no prior work has paid sufficient attention to the shareholder value implications 
of the ICMs or equivalently stock price stability around these important transactions, particularly 
with respect to M&A investment decisions within ICMs after the completion of a major 
government initiated regulatory intervention i.e. Split-Share Structure Reform. In this study, we 
try to bridge this vital gap.  
We conduct a battery of difference-in-differences tests, and document two important 
findings. First, bidders’ short-term excess return around deal announcement increased principally 
in the post-split-share structure period compared to pre-split-share structure reform period, and the 
performance improvement was significantly larger for related-party than non-related-party M&A. 
Second, these effects are particularly strong among the sub-sample of low mutual fund 
shareholding acquirers compared to the high mutual fund shareholding acquirers. Our evidence is 
consistent with Berkman et al. (2011) and Campello et al. (2014) on heterogeneous effect of major 
corporate governance reform, wherein weakly governed firms benefited substantially more from 
the government initiated regulatory reform in China. These results remain robust for group-
affiliated and non-affiliated acquirers. 
                                                          
1 Chen et al. (2008) find a significant positive impact on corporate profitability and efficiency when firm controlling 
ownership is transferred from the state to a private entity rather than another branch of state. 
2 See section 3 for the definition of related-parties in China.  
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Abusive related-party transactions – where a party in control of a company enters into a 
transaction leading into the value destruction for the non-controlling shareholders – are one of the 
main attributes to stock market instability and the biggest corporate governance challenge facing 
the Asian business landscape (OECD, 2015). In this paper, we present new findings which are 
contradictory to a negative view of related-party transactions (Bae et al., 2002; Cheung et al., 2006; 
Jiang et al., 2010; Jian and Wong, 2010; Peng et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2014; etc.). In particular, we 
extend Bae et al. (2002)’s study which examines tunneling through value-destroying acquisitions 
by Korean business group-affiliated (Chaebol-affiliated) bidders, or Peng et al. (2011) wherein 
financial conditions play an important role in affecting tunneling- or propping-based related-party 
transactions in China. Contrary to these prior studies, our empirical evidence is in line with the 
bright-side view of ICMs (Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 1997), and offers new insight to ICMs 
theoretical framework, i.e. corporate governance improvement through regulatory intervention 
within a country can determine the trade-off between advantages and disadvantages of ICMs. This 
study hence provides Chinese experience which governments in Asia may compare while seeking 
answers to common problems in fighting abusive related-party transactions. 
On another front, privatization continued in post-2000 period, but the pattern of global 
privatization shifted from secondary-share public offering in Western Europe to a wide variety of 
divestment methods in emerging markets, which calls for further policy evaluations, especially in 
China where it significantly accelerated in post-split-share structure reform period (Megginson, 
2017). In 2000 China’s GDP at market prices was US$1.21 trillion, and represented only about 
3.6% of global GDP; by 2015 these values had reached US$11.06 trillion and 17.52%, 
respectively. Over this short period, China became the world’s leading manufacturer, exporter, and 
based on GDP measured at purchasing power parity, the largest economy internationally 
(Megginson, 2017). Such unprecedented growth in less than two decades by Chinese firms cannot 
be achieved without consistent improvement of its corporate governance environment, particularly 
its legal system, accounting standard, and capital market enforcement mechanisms (Firth et al., 
2010; 2016). These dynamic changes provide us with an ideal transforming corporate environment 
to test shifting roles of ICMs. 
In terms of policy implications, we believe that by holding non-tradable shares, state / legal 
person was deprived from the wealth (or capital) gains through successful investment decisions, 
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and thus had limited incentives to monitor managers or ensure firm value maximization. Hence, 
we provide empirical evidence that the 2005-split-share structure reform has been beneficial to 
minority investors and firms alike, especially when the Chinese firms were opening doors for both 
international investments in China and acquisitions by Chinese firms abroad. Overtime, this long-
term commitment has benefitted the capital markets in China in the form of constant attention to 
the quality of governance, presence of self-regulatory set-up to control managerial collusion with 
dominant shareholders, and most importantly enhanced cooperation of international institutions 
with firms in China.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
background of ICMs and split-share structure reform along with our main hypotheses. Section 3 
describes the data source, sample selection process, and methodology. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results, and we conclude the paper in section 5. 
2. Institutional background in China and hypothesis development 
Business groups are the dominant organisational form of large firms outside the United 
States, especially in emerging markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; OECD, 2015). Network of firms 
which are often legally independent, but engage in capital transactions among them creates ICMs. 
Stein (1997) suggests that ICMs are an important source of capital in emerging economies due to 
underdeveloped external financial markets. Corporations in emerging markets are often under the 
control of a dominant shareholder (Gopalan et al., 2007). Concentrated ownership within firms 
can lead to principal–principal conflict of interest between controlling and minority shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997), wherein former are motivated to expropriate the later by 
tunnelling private wealth from the listed firms (Johnson et al., 2000). In brief, tunnelling is a 
common mechanism through which controlling shareholders extract private rent from ICMs, and 
is particularly prevalent in emerging markets (e.g.: Shin and Stulz, 1998; Allen et al., 2005; Baek, 
et al., 2006; Jiang et al., 2010; etc.). 
However, some studies suggest that ICMs, especially within a business-group setting can 
add value by reducing asymmetric information while making investment decisions, lowering 
transaction cost through intra-group related-party transactions, mitigating external capital market 
frictions, offering cheap financing to distressed group-affiliated firms, and sharing financial risk 
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among members (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006; Gopalan et al., 2007). 
In essence, ICMs can mimic important characteristics of market mechanism in advanced 
economies and offer an effective economic response to emerging market limitations – poor 
investor protection, weak contract enforcement, low information disclosure, and underdeveloped 
external capital markets (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; Amewu and Alagidede, 2018). Hence, prior 
literature has proposed two contradictory theories of ICMs – the bright-side view (advantages) and 
dark-side view (disadvantages) of ICMs. The bright-side view suggests that corporate headquarters 
with intensive monitoring power, strong control rights, and lower information asymmetry will 
adopt a winner-picking strategy by allocating internal resources to the subsidiaries with better 
investment opportunities (Gertner et al., 1994; Stein, 1997). The dark-side view states that ICMs 
are likely to suffer from managerial entrenchment i.e. rent-seeking, power-grabbing, empire-
building, and tunneling behavior, leading to value-destroying investment decisions. The problem 
is exacerbated in emerging markets due to weak institutional set-up (Khanna and Palepu, 2000; 
Scharfstein and Stein, 2000). 
Related-party transactions are commonly perceived as profit-shifting tools among group-
affiliated companies to reduce taxes, prop-up earnings, and tunnel profits (Jian and Wong, 2010; 
Peng et al., 2011; Liu and Tian, 2012; Liao et al., 2014). Several recent studies have investigated 
stock market’s reaction to the announcement of related-party transactions by listed firms as a direct 
evidence of either shareholder value- gains (propping) or losses (tunnelling). For instance, Bae et 
al. (2002) reports that M&As made by Korean-Chaebol firms experienced significant negative 
returns around their announcement, but these acquisitions increased the value of other firms within 
their affiliated group. Cheung et al. (2006) show that Chinese firms listed in Hong Kong earn 
significant negative excess return and lower CAR after announcing connected transactions than 
arm’s length transactions. Peng et al. (2011), based on a pre-split-share structure sample find that 
financially healthy Chinese listed firms announcing related-party asset acquisitions experienced 
significant negative returns, but earned positive abnormal returns when they were classified as 
distressed by either of the two stock exchanges in China. Unlike Bae et al. (2002) which analyses 
both acquirers and target firms in Korea, we follow Peng et al. (2011) and only analyse listed 
Chinese acquirers, due to the lack of information on target firms and trading party in related-party 
transactions since they are virtually all private firms in China. 
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In the context of our study, due to the organizational structure of Chinese listed firms and 
their reliance on financial resources from corporate groups, ICMs play an important role for 
Chinese bidders. In early research on the efficiency of ICMs, Gertner et al. (1994) and Stein (1997) 
suggest that ICMs have several important advantages; including increased monitoring power, 
strong control rights, and superior information flow enjoyed by group headquarters to ensure 
internal funds are allocated efficiently to subsidiary firms with best investment opportunities. 
Khanna and Palepu (2000) argue that ICMs in developing countries can mimic the effective market 
mechanism in advanced economies, thus better facilitating efficient allocation of financial and 
managerial resources. Almeida and Wolfenzon (2006) find that pyramid ownership structure of 
family business groups provides an economic advantage in setting up new companies when 
external funding is limited. Gopalan et al. (2007) reports that business groups in India provide 
intragroup loans to weak member firms to avoid bankruptcy. He et al. (2013) investigates Chinese 
business groups, and find that ICMs add value by sharing risk among member firms and provide 
alternative; often cheaper financial channels for group-affiliated firms. 
The primary objective of the 2005-split-share structure reform in China was to align the 
interests of minority and controlling shareholders (Firth et al., 2010; Li et al., 2011; Chen et al., 
2012; Liu and Tian, 2012; Liao et al., 2014; Hou et al., 2015). In light of the benefits of the 2005-
split-share structure reform on firm performance and governance documented in literature, we 
expect ICMs to play a stronger role in facilitating value-enhancing related-party M&As for 
Chinese acquirers after the reform. First, the successful completion of split-share structure reform 
is likely to reduce controlling shareholders tunnelling in the form of related-party transactions in 
China (Liu and Tian, 2012; Liao et al., 2014). Second, due to the vested financial interest in the 
form of stock-based compensation and the fear of job termination in case of poor stock 
performance post-acquisition, managers are better incentivised to grant internal financial resources 
to profit maximizing investment decisions in the post-reform period (Campello et al., 2014). 
Additionally, compared to the bidders announcing non-related-party M&A deals, related-party 
M&A bidders can obtain a better flow of information on operational and financial performance of 
related targets due to decreased information asymmetry between the two parties. Therefore, within 
the ICM setting; we believe that related-party M&A deals undertaken by Chinese bidders in the 
post-split-share structure reform period generated higher shareholder wealth compared to non-
related-party M&As. By employing M&A event study methodology and using difference-in-
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differences tests, we develop our first hypothesis that related-party M&As can generate larger 
positive excess return in the post-split-share structure reform period. First hypothesis is given as: 
H1: Based on deal announcement CARs, merger performance improved following the split-share 
structure reform, and related-party M&As experienced larger post-split-share structure 
reform performance improvements than non- related-party M&As. 
With respect to our second hypothesis, we study the effects of institutional shareholders, 
specifically mutual funds on the market valuation of firms announcing related-party M&As before 
and after the split-share structure reform. The Chinese emerging stock market is dominated by the 
retail investors (Li and Wang, 2010). To strengthen corporate governance and reduce speculative 
behaviour in the stock market, the Chinese government made the strategic decision in 2000 to 
develop mutual funds as institutional investors (Firth et al., 2010; 2016; Wang et al., 2019). 
Institutional ownership is an important governance mechanism which plays a crucial role in 
monitoring managerial decision-making and firm performance. In Chinese reference, supervisory 
role of the institutional investors is particularly important since the protection of minority 
shareholder rights is weak and the level of corporate governance quality is relatively low (Allen et 
al., 2005; Firth et al., 2010; 2016; Wang et al., 2019). Besides better-informed institutional traders 
help to lower the stock price volatility in China (Li and Wang, 2010). Although institutional 
investors may not be directly involved in M&A activity, they have a fiduciary obligation to monitor 
firm management in order to maximize their own investment value. Hence, the presence of 
institutional investors may be associated with value-enhancing acquisitions because they can 
administer their right either directly by the voice of proxy vote or indirectly through voting with 
their feet (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). Therefore, the involvement of institutional investors in 
shareholder activism can resolve the principal-agent conflicts and benefit shareholders in the long-
run (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997; Chen et al., 2007).  
Some researchers suggest that the presence of institutional investors, particularly large 
shareholding of institutions with long-term investment horizon can facilitate merger bids through 
informational advantage gathered by the financial analysts, which bridges the gap of information 
asymmetry between bidders and targets (Chen et al., 2007; Ferreira et al., 2009). High institutional 
ownership among bidders is positively associated with successful execution of takeover, and these 
bidders are less likely to pursue value-destroying acquisitions (Ferreira et al., 2009). More recently, 
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Firth et al. (2010; 2016) and Wang et al. (2019) have emphasize on the rapid growth of institutional 
shareholders in listed firms, primarily driven by mutual funds since early 2000s. Chen et al. (2007) 
also emphasize that only mutual funds with large shareholding and long-run investment horizon 
have the power and incentives to monitor M&A decisions. Therefore, bidders with no or low 
mutual fund ownership are subject to poorer quality of external corporate governance compared 
to their peers. Consistent with Berkman et al. (2011) and Campello et al. (2014) that weakly 
governed firms benefited more from regulatory governance reform in China, we predict that 
bidders with no or limited mutual fund ownership will benefit more from related-party M&As in 
an ICM setting under the improved governance system following the split-share structure reform. 
So, our second hypothesis is as follows: 
H2: The difference in post-split-share structure reform performance improvements (between 
related-party and non- related-party M&As) is larger within deals made by lower mutual 
fund shareholding acquirers than acquirers with higher mutual fund shareholding. 
3. Data description and methodology 
We collect M&A data from China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database (e.g.: Jian and Wong, 2010; Liao et al., 2014; Bi and Wang, 2018; etc.). We apply 
following set of criteria for M&A deals made by firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges from Jan. 1st, 2000 to Dec. 31st, 2014: 1) The merger deal must be successful. 2) The 
deal value is at least 10 million Chinese Yuan or more. 3) Neither the bidder nor the target is in 
financial or utility sector. 4) Multiple deals announced by the same bidder on the same date and 
within 21-day event window (-10 days to +10 days) surrounding the announcement, and the deals 
announced on non-trading days are excluded. 5) Acquirer’s stock prices must be available for 250 
trading days prior to deal announcement and available for each day within the 21-day event 
window (-10 days to +10 days around the deal announcement). 6) The year-end financial and 
accounting data for the bidder prior to the announcement-year should be available. 7) Outliers with 
obviously flawed accounting ratios, including negative book values are dropped. Our final sample 
contains 2,220 successful M&A deals from 1,438 Chinese listed acquiring firms over a fifteen-
year sample period. 687 deals took place before the acquiring firms successfully completed split-
share structure reform and 1,533 deals were announced after they completed the reform.  
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We follow classification of related-party M&A and Non-related-party M&A deals 
according to deal type information compiled by CSMAR3. This divides our data into two groups 
of 898 related-party M&A and 1,322 non-related-party M&A deals. Bidder-level data on corporate 
governance (including firm ownership and controlling shareholder type), accounting, and stock 
prices is also collected from CSMAR. Furthermore, following He et al. (2013), we classify bidders 
as group-affiliated bidders if their ultimate controlling shareholders have at least two independent 
firms. All other bidders for related-party M&As are classified as non-group-affiliated bidders. We 
manually collect this information for all sample firms from their official websites and financial 
reports. Table 1 summarizes the deal information by merger announcement year in panel A and by 
industry in panel B. In panel A, we observe that around 72% (1,595) of the total deals were 
undertaken by acquirers affiliated with business groups. Approximately 90% (1,995) of the deals 
were paid by pure cash, and remaining 5.3% (120) by cash and stocks mixed. As over half of listed 
companies in China are in the manufacturing sector, panel B shows that circa 60% (1,306) 
acquisitions in China were concentrated in this sector. 
[Please insert Table 1 about here] 
To examine gains and losses in equity value, we use standard event study methodology to 
compute CARs of the bidders based on market model over a 3-day event window (-1, +1) and a 5-
day event window (-2, +2) around the deal announcement dates using the following steps: 
First, daily abnormal returns for stock i on day t, denoted as 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, is calculated as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) 
Where 𝑅𝑖𝑡  and 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) are the corresponding actual stock return and the expected stock 
return respectively. The expect stock return 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is computed from the market model: 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑀𝑡 
The parameters 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽𝑖 are estimated using the actual stock returns and market index 
returns over the estimation period from 250 to 10 trading days prior to the merger announcement 
date. Using 𝛼𝑖  and 𝛽𝑖  obtained for each event-firm, as well as Shanghai or Shenzhen value-
                                                          
3 See Huang (2016) for definitions of related-parties as per Chinese GAAP. 
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weighted market index return on day t (depending on the firm’s listing location), namely 𝑅𝑀𝑡, the 
expected return on stock i for day t is then computed again using the above market model.  
Second, we calculate 3-day CARs and 5-day CARs as the sum of the daily abnormal returns 
through the announcement event window (-1, +1) and (-2, +2) respectively as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−1, +1)𝑖 =∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
1
𝑡=−1 ; 𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2, +2)𝑖 =∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
2
𝑡=−2 . 
To test hypothesis H1, we adopt the following difference-in-differences model: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝜏𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖
+ 𝑖 
------ (1) 
Dependent variable in the equation is 3-day or 5-day CARs. 𝑅𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑖 is a dummy which 
equals to 1 if the acquirer and the target firms are related-parties, or otherwise 0. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖 is also a 
dummy which equals to 1 if the acquiring firm has successfully completed split-share structure 
reform in financial years prior to the M&A deal announcement, or otherwise 0. Coefficient 𝛽3 on 
the interaction variable 𝑅𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖 shows the difference in post-split-share structure 
performance improvements between related-party and non-related-party M&As. Coefficient 𝛽1 
shows the marginal effect of related-party M&A deals on CARs compared to non-related-party 
M&As deals prior to split-share structure reform. Coefficient 𝛽2 shows the effect of split-share 
structure on non-related-party M&A CARs. 𝛼0 is the regression intercept and 𝑖 is the error term. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖  represents a number of control variables. First, in line with recent M&A 
literature (Ferreira et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2017; Amewu and Alagidede, 2018; Bi and Wang, 2018), 
we include basic deal characteristics. LOGRS is the log of relative deal size. CASHPAY 
(STOCKPAY) is a dummy which equals to 1 if payment method is pure cash only (stocks only), 
and 0 if otherwise. SOE is a dummy if the acquirer firm’s controlling shareholder is the 
government or a government agency. TARGETLIST is a dummy which equals to 1 if target firm 
is listed on stock exchanges, and 0 if not. Additionally, aspects of corporate governance are also 
considered. These are the controlling shareholders’ excess control rights (EXCON), percentage 
shareholding by the largest shareholder (NO1SH), CEO duality (CEOD), log of total number of 
directors on board (BSIZE), and percentage of independent directors on the board (BIND). We 
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also control for mutual fund percentage ownership (FUNDSH) as of the financial year-end before 
the deal announcement due to their monitoring role on firm governance (Firth et al. 2010; 2016). 
We also control for basic acquirer firm characteristics as of the fiscal year-end prior to deal 
announcements – firm size (LOGMC), market-to-book ratio (M/B ratio), net operating free cash 
flow scaled by total sales (NOPCF/SALES), and industry median-adjusted financial leverage 
(EXLEV) (Liu and Tian, 2012). Following Bouwman et al. (2009), we control for industry and 
year fixed effects by including industry dummies INDi and year dummies YEARi in the model. 
In order to test hypotheses H2, we adopt a revised version of the model described for H1 
above, namely difference-in-difference-in-differences model, as follows: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖 +
𝛽5𝐻𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑅𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖 + 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛿𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑖 +
𝜏𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅𝑖 + 𝑖  
----- (2) 
In equation (2), 𝐻𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖 is a dummy which equals to 1 if the mutual fund percentage 
shareholding (FUNDSH) in the acquirer prior to deal announcement is above its industry-mean 
value and 0 if it is below the industry-mean value. This triple difference-in-differences model 
assumes that the difference in post-split-share structure reform performance improvements 
(between related-party and non-related-party M&As) depends on the mutual funds proportion of 
shareholding in the acquiring firm. In particular, 𝛽3 now gives the difference in post-split-share 
structure performance improvements (between related-party and non-related-party M&As) within 
deals made by the low or no fund shareholding acquirers (when the dummy variable HFUND takes 
the value of 0). 𝛽4 further shows the additional difference in post-split-share structure performance 
improvements (between related-party and non- related-party M&As) within deals made by the 
high fund shareholding acquirers (compared to deals made by the low or no fund shareholding 
acquirers), and tests hypothesis H2.4  Interaction 𝑅𝑃𝑀𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖  and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑖 ∗ 𝐻𝐹𝑈𝑁𝐷𝑖  are 
added to the model to ensure proper model specification.5 A detailed description of all the variables 
                                                          
4 Hence the difference in post-split-share structure reform performance improvements (between related-party and non-
related-party M&As) among deals made by the high mutual fund shareholding acquirers is 𝛽3 + 𝛽4. 
5 Results on the triple interaction are not affected in models without these two additional interactions. 
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is provided in Appendix A1. Appendix A2 reports the summary statistics for these variables.6 To 
account for outliers, we winsorize all non-dummy variables at upper and lower 1% level.7 
Figure 1 compares the difference in CAARs over 21-day event window (10 days prior to 
and 10 days after) between M&A deals before the completion of split-share structure reform and 
those undertaken after the reform. It shows that CAARs for all the M&A deals post-split-share 
structure reform strongly outperform CAARs pre-split-share structure reform. Figure 2 displays 
the difference of CAARs between related-party M&As deals made before the completion of split-
share structure reform and related-party M&As deals undertaken after the reform. We notice that 
the overall trend of related-party M&A CAARs in figure 2 is similar to that of the full sample 
M&A CAARs in figure 1. After the split-share structure, related-party M&A deals experienced 
excess CAARs of 4% on average compared to the related-party M&A deals before the split-share 
structure after deal announcement. Finally, figure 3 compares the difference in CAARs between 
non-related-party M&A deals before and after successful completion of split-share structure 
reform by the acquiring firm. Here too we observe a significant increase in CAARs for non-related-
party M&A deals post-split-share structure reform compared to non-related-party M&A deals pre-
split-share structure reform. We further notice that the average CAAR for the non-related-party 
M&A deals post-split-share structure reform in figure 3 is relatively lower by about 3% compared 
to the related-party M&A deals announced over the same period in figure 2. Overall findings in 
these graphs are in line with our expectations discussed in section 2 on hypotheses development.  
[Please insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here] 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
To examine the validity of our hypotheses, we start with the basic mean difference tests on 
acquirers’ 3-day and 5-day CARs around M&A announcements in tables 2 and 3. In table 2, we 
conduct mean difference tests on bidder announcement CARs for firms that completed the split-
share structure reform for the full M&A sample. Panel A shows that 3-day and 5-day CARs are 
                                                          
6 We note that only 1% of the target firms are listed. Information on target firms for Chinese M&A deals is limited. 
Neither target firm industry classification nor ownership type appears available from CSMAR. 
7 Variables with a zero lower bound are winsorized at upper 1% only. 
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significant and positive over the 15-year sample period. Notably, M&As post-split-share structure 
reform significantly outperformed M&As pre-split-share structure reform. Mean difference for 3-
day (and 5-day) CARs before and after the reform is significant and positive 1.25% (and 1.68%). 
We then test this difference among related-party M&As in panel B, where both 3-day CARs 
(1.96%) and 5-day CARs (2.91%) are statistically significant during the post reform period. 
Similar to the mean differences reported in panel A, the mean differences in 3-day and 5-day CARs 
between related-party M&As post-split-share structure and pre-split-share structure are positive 
and significant. However, when we repeat our tests using non-related-party M&As in panel C, the 
mean difference between non-related-party M&As post-split-share structure reform and pre-split-
share structure appears to be significant and positive for 3-day CARs and insignificant for 5-day 
CARs. In Panel D, we perform two simple univariates difference-in-differences tests. We show 
that pre-split-share structure, related-party M&As significantly underperformed compared to non-
related-party M&As, for e.g., significant difference on 5-day CARs is -1.22%. However, post-
split-share structure reform, related-party M&As outperformed non-related-party M&As (for e.g., 
difference for 5-day CARs is significant 1.31%). The significant difference-in-differences of 
[1.31%-(-1.22%)]=2.53% indicate value gains, where the response to the split-share structure 
reform is larger for related-party M&A than non-related-party M&As, i.e. a positive difference in 
the performance improvements. 
Mean difference tests in table 2 strongly support our hypothesis H1. The post-split-share 
structure performance improvement among related-party M&As, as measured by their CARs, is 
larger than that among non-related-party M&As. So, we can assume that ICMs began to play a 
better role in facilitating value-enhancing related-party M&As following governance improvement 
in the form of successful completion of split-share structure reform. It appears that market 
perceives successful completion of split-share structure reform at firm-level as a signal of reduced 
information asymmetry and principal-principal agency conflict. These results show that value of 
regulatory intervention is positive to firms in general, but changes in magnitude depending upon 
the level of connectedness of the firm, and nature of the deal. 
[Please insert Table 2 about here] 
In table 3, we then conduct mean difference tests by acquirers’ 5-day CARs based on their 
mutual fund shareholding. We partition our sample into high and low mutual fund shareholding 
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acquirers by comparing their shareholdings by mutual funds prior to M&A announcements with 
their respective industry mean mutual fund shareholdings, i.e. the dummy variable HFUND. Panel 
A illustrates that among high-fund acquirers non-related-party M&As significantly outperformed 
related-party M&As by 1.15% whereas among low-fund acquirers non-related-party M&As 
weakly outperformed related-party M&As by 0.81%. The statistically significant difference in 
these differences is 1.96%=[0.81%-(-1.15%)]. Panel B repeats the above tests using deals that took 
place pre-split-share structure reform and find that for both high-fund and low-fund acquirers, non-
related-party M&As significantly outperformed related-party M&As. The significant difference in 
these differences is of marginal -0.09%. Then in Panel C, we repeat these tests using deals that 
took place post-split-share structure reform. Results appear consistent and considerably stronger 
than those in panel A, indicating the full sample results are driven by post-split-share structure 
reform deals. Finally, we perform difference-in-differences tests in panel D similar to that of table 
2. The first column in the panel again shows exactly the same findings as in table 2 that the 
difference in the differences of related-party CARs and non-related-party M&A CARs by the split-
share structure reform is 2.53% and significant. Next, this difference-in-differences is 3.49% and 
significant among low-fund acquirers. The last column of panel D represents a triple difference-
in-differences test, which test the difference between the two difference-in-differences in columns 
2 and 3 of the panel D. This triple difference-in-differences is 3.32% and statistically significant. 
All in all, table 3 tests show strong support for hypotheses H2 on the difference in the post-
split-share structure reform performance improvement for deals by high-fund acquirers and low-
fund acquirers. They indicate the benefit of split-share structure reform completion in enhancing 
value of related-party M&A deals among acquirers with lower mutual fund ownership, which were 
in general associated with weaker governance. Our results indicate that the state intervention has 
a positive post-event market reaction on firms’ capital market decisions with limited mutual fund 
ownership, since they were considered viable candidate for managerial entrenchment, and 
controlling shareholder-manager collusion to expropriate minority shareholders by directly 
pursuing value-destroying acquisitions. Overall, our results suggest that firms with higher levels 
of expropriation (proxied by low mutual fund shareholding as an indicator of poor quality of 




 [Please insert Table 3 about here] 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
We now turn to our difference-in-differences multivariate regression tests as specified in 
equation (1) of section 3. Models 1-6 in table 4 depict that the estimated coefficients of the 
interaction term RPMA*SSSR are consistently positive and significant, thereby strongly 
supporting our hypothesis H1. These results are consistent with the univariate tests for CARs in 
table 2. For instance, model 6 reports that related-party M&A deals led to a significant 2.999% 
value loss during 5-day event window before the split-share structure reform but experienced 
larger post-split-share structure performance improvement (of 3.297%) compared to non-related-
party M&As deals. These results are consistent with our expectation that ICMs began to play a 
vital role for the bidders in providing potential information, financing, or monitoring advantages 
to facilitate value-maximizing related-party M&As, especially due to a reduction in tunneling 
incentives of controlling shareholders and improvement of managerial efficiency once the firm has 
completed split-share structure reform. 
Regarding the control variables in table 4, generally results are theoretically consistent. 
The relative size of deal value to the bidder’s market value is positively related to both 3-day and 
5-day CARs. Contrary to the studies on M&A payment methods in the U.S. and the U.K. which 
reported cash bidders significantly outperformed stock bidders (Bouwman et al., 2009), our results 
show that cash payment has a significant negative impact on CARs in models 2-3 and 5-6, and 
vice-versa for stock offers in models 2, 5, and 6. The coefficient for listing status of target firms is 
significant and positive; indicating lower information asymmetry and easier pricing of listed 
targets is rewarded by the market. According to Officer (2007), market discounts for acquisitions 
of unlisted targets relative to publicly listed targets due to “the value of the provision of liquidity”. 
We also note that this is different from prior evidence on M&A in the U.S. which shows that 
takeover of privately held targets generated higher abnormal returns relative to publicly listed 
targets (Chang, 1998). Market capitalization, growth opportunity, and cash flow liquidity are 
negatively correlated with the announcement effect suggesting that large bidders with sufficient 
cash flow and growth opportunities are more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions. This is 
in vein with Harford (1999), since market perceives merger deals to be value-destroying exercise 
for large, cash-rich acquirers who should first exploit the internal growth opportunities rather than 
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pursuing outside acquisitions. Regarding governance variables, neither excess leverage nor excess 
control rights seems to have a significant effect on CARs. The coefficient of board size is 
significant and negative for both 3-day and 5-day CARs indicating that smaller board is more 
effective in facilitating value-enhancing M&As. 
[Please insert Table 4 about here] 
In China, the type of controlling ownership has strong influence over business decisions 
(Chen et al., 2008; Bi and Wang, 2018; Wang et al., 2019). In table 5, We conduct an additional 
analysis by repeating table 4 regressions using sub-samples classified by the type of controlling 
shareholders, namely; Privately-Owned Enterprises – POEs and different types of State-Owned 
Enterprises – SOEs, central SOEs, and local/provincial SOEs. We note that the higher post-split-
share structure performance improvement among related-party M&As (compared to non-related-
party M&As) remains robust for POE/SOE/Local_SOE sub-samples whereas insignificant for 
Central_SOEs. The exception regarding Central SOEs may be partially due to small number of 
observations. Besides, provincial governments in China assist local firms in corporate restructuring 
activities like M&A by arranging, identifying and facilitating negotiations with potential target 
firms. It is also in line with prior evidence that local/provincial governments have stronger 
incentives to be involved with listed firms in their administrative regions (Chen et al., 2008). 
[Please insert Table 5 about here] 
In table 6, we perform triple difference-in-differences tests in line with equation (2) in 
section 3 to further investigate the heterogeneous post-split-share structure reform performance 
improvements among related-party M&As made by acquirer with varying levels of mutual fund 
shareholding prior to their M&A deal announcements. For robustness, we use three alternative 
measures of mutual fund ownership: (1) the percentage of mutual fund ownership (FUNDSH), (2) 
a dummy variable for bidders with high mutual fund ownership above industry mean level 
(HFUND), and (3) the relative size of mutual fund shareholding to that of the largest shareholder 
(FUNDSH/NO1).8 Basically, we are interested in the estimated coefficients of triple interaction – 
RPMA*SSSR*FUNDSH, RPMA*SSSR*HFUND, and RPMA*SSSR*FUNDSH/NO1 which 
demonstrates the relevance of our hypothesis H2. Throughout all models, the triple interactions 
                                                          
8 We also find similar results to model 3 when we replace FUNDSH/NO1 with FUNDSH/CONRIGHT. 
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are consistently negative and significant suggesting that related-party M&As after the reform 
generated significantly higher CARs for bidders with low or no mutual fund ownership compared 
to their counterparts. These findings directly support our hypothesis H2, i.e. positive improvement 
in short-run market valuations of related-party M&As after the split-share structure reform is more 
significant for bidders with lower institutional shareholding.9 
Next, the sub-sample analysis in models 4&5 of table 6 also shows that regardless of the 
bidder-type (SOEs or POEs), RPMA*SSSR*FUNDSH remains statistically significant further 
confirming our argument for H2. Minority retail investor shareholdings in Chinese firms is often 
too defused to influence corporate decisions (Firth et al., 2010). When internal governance quality 
is weak, especially in SOEs, mutual funds are often likely to take a role of an important monitoring 
mechanism over firm managers and controlling shareholders in China (Chen et al., 2007; Firth et 
al., 2010), possibly through voting with their feet (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). A positive effect of 
mutual fund ownership on firm-level corporate governance is generally expected. Henceforth, it is 
to be expected that the improvement of governance following the split-share structure reform is 
larger among firms with low or zero mutual fund shareholding (i.e. weakly governed firms) 
compared to their peers. These results are consistent with Campello et al. (2014) and Berkman et 
al. (2011) which document the heterogeneous effect of major governance reforms in China.  
[Please insert Table 6 about here] 
Lastly, from the perspective of organizational structure, controlling shareholders have 
much lower, if any, incentives to prop-up firms not affiliated within their business groups. 
Therefore, in a further robustness test as reported in Appendix A3, by splitting our sample 
acquirers into group-affiliated and non-group-affiliated firms, we observe that irrespective of the 
group-affiliation status of the bidder firm, the coefficient of SSSR*RPMA is significant and 
positive. While, triple interaction term RPMA*SSSR*GROUP is significant and negative, 
indicating additional value gains following related-party M&As among non-group-affiliated 
acquirers that are unlikely to be subject to controlling shareholder propping.10 
                                                          
9 We find qualitatively and quantitatively similar results when we replace mutual fund shareholding with the total 
institutional ownership in the Chinese acquiring firm. We would like to thank our referee for making this suggestion. 
10 In light of Cheung et al. (2006), Jian and Wong (2010), and Jiang et al. (2010), we also control for the changes in 




In summary, our study uses China’s 2005-split-share structure reform as a natural 
experiment to examine the potential impact of governance quality changes on merger-related value 
gains from ICMs by public firms in China. Empirical results show that related-party M&As 
significantly underperformed compared to non-related-party M&As prior to split-share structure 
reform, whereas outperformed non-related-party M&As after successful completion of the reform. 
Furthermore, bidders with low or no mutual fund ownership which undertook related-party M&As 
after completing the reform earned sizeable excess abnormal returns than bidders with high mutual 
fund ownership. We also find a significant positive related-party M&A deal announcement effect 
by SOEs at local/provincial level, and those with significantly lower mutual fund shareholding 
post-split-share structure reform. Our findings remain robust for both group-affiliated and non-
affiliated acquirers and after accounting for alternative channels of tunnelling and possible 
controlling shareholders propping. 
Based on our empirical results, we argue that the positive market reaction to related-party 
M&As after the completion of split-share structure reform could be principally driven by the value 
added from ICMs in China. Therefore, unlike prior findings, which generally hold a negative view 
of related-party transactions, our paper contributes to the literature on corporate governance, 
M&A, and ICMs in general, arguing the bright-side view benefits of ICMs within an emerging 
market setting. This helps shed light on the role of regulatory reforms in facilitating overall 
improvement of ICMs and governance mechanism in emerging economies where external capital 
markets are underdeveloped.  
                                                          
party sales scaled by total assets, dummy variables for financial distress, negative return on equity, seasonal equity 
offering in the merger event year, and rights issue, respectively. Results remain consistent and are available from 
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Table 1: Merger deal statistics. 
This table summarizes the main characteristics of the merger deals in our sample. This sample consists of 2,220 
successful merger deals in China from Jan. 1st, 2000 to Dec. 31st, 2014. All acquirers are listed firms, either on 
Shanghai Stock Exchange or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In panel A, we characterize mergers by year of deal 
announcements. Deal values are reported in millions of RMB. We show the number of deals between related-party 
firms (RPMA) and between non-related-party firms (Non-RPMA). Then classify deals according to the nature of 
acquirer firms, i.e. state-owned enterprises (SOE) or privately-owned enterprises (POE). We also divide the deals 
based on payment methods used: 100% cash financed, 100% stock financed, or partly financed by both cash and stock. 
Panel B reports the number, proportion, and size characteristics of mergers across different industry classifications 
based on the tier-1 industry classifications by the CSRC. 
 



























                    
2000 108 19,500 181 48 49 59 88 20 103 0 5 
2001 96 9,380 98 52 67 29 84 12 95 0 1 
2002 83 9,640 116 41 46 37 71 12 78 1 4 
2003 112 15,800 141 41 56 56 94 18 110 0 2 
2004 108 13,100 121 57 62 46 96 12 104 1 3 
2005 79 8,250 104 47 47 32 60 19 76 0 3 
2006 101 15,700 155 51 54 47 81 20 98 2 1 
2007 155 79,400 512 77 72 83 129 26 140 12 3 
2008 127 106,000 837 54 48 79 103 24 115 9 3 
2009 139 82,800 596 64 53 86 114 25 123 12 4 
2010 146 55,100 377 70 44 102 110 36 133 7 6 
2011 187 96,100 514 62 60 127 130 57 178 6 3 
2012 235 92,300 393 80 77 158 149 86 216 14 5 
2013 252 114,000 451 94 70 182 137 115 209 21 22 
2014 292 182,000 622 132 93 199 148 108 217 20 55 
Total 2,220 899,100 405 67 898 1,322 1595 625 1,995 105 120 
            















               
Real Estate  217 9.86% 82572 381 128 
Manufacturing  1,306 59.36% 463087 355 55 
Food and Hotel Services 20 0.91% 4580 229 104 
Wholesale and Retail 189 8.59% 88506 468 85 
Combined and Other Industries 31 1.41% 2376 77 47 
Transportation, Warehouse and Postal Services 96 4.36% 110487 1151 140 
Lending and Business Services 22 1.00% 5152 234 82 
Construction Business 54 2.45% 8279 153 65 
Environmental Engineering and Public Infrastructure Management 28 1.27% 10736 383 77 
Culture, Sports and Entertainment  28 1.27% 9947 355 50 
Mineral Mining  88 4.00% 49342 561 115 
Telecommunication, Software and Information Technology 96 4.36% 47549 495 94 
Agriculture and Fishing Industry 33 1.50% 7680 233 54 
Scientific Research and Technological Services 9 0.41% 719 80 44 
Health Care and Social Work 1 0.05% 10 10 10 
Education 2 0.09% 611 306 103 
Total 2,220 100.00% 899,100 405 67 
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Table 2: Mean difference tests on CARs by the Split-Share Structure Reform (SSSR). 
This table reports the 3-day and 5-day CARs for all acquirers around M&A deal announcements before and after the 
acquiring firm successfully completed the split-share structure reform. Panel A reports the average acquirer CAR 
values for the full sample, panel B reports the average CAR values for the related-party mergers (RPMA) only, panel 
C reports the average CAR values for the non-related-party mergers (Non-RPMA) only, and panel D reports the 
difference-in-differences tests. Across all the four panels, we report the average 3-day and 5-day CARs around the 
deal announcement date for the full sample (Full Sample), before the acquirer successfully finished the split-share 
structure reform (Before the split-share structure reform), after the acquirer successfully finished the split-share 
structure reform (After the split-share structure reform) and the ‘Difference’ between the two samples. We report the 
two-sample mean-comparison test (T-statistics) in brackets. ***, **, * represents significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 Full Sample Before the SSSR After the SSSR Difference  
CAR [-1, +1] 1.16%*** 0.30%** 1.55%*** 1.25%*** 
 [8.77] [1.97] [8.68] [5.36] 
Obs. 2220 687 1533  
CAR[-2, +2]  1.52%*** 0.36%* 2.04%*** 1.68%*** 
 [8.86] [1.92] [8.77] [5.61] 
Obs. 2220 687 1533  
Panel B: Related-Party M&As (RPMA) 
 Full Sample Before the SSSR After the SSSR Difference  
CAR [-1, +1] 1.10%*** -0.07% 1.96%*** 2.03%*** 
 [4.91] [-0.36] [5.54] [4.99] 
Obs. 898 381 517  
CAR [-2, +2]  1.60%*** -0.18% 2.91%*** 3.09%*** 
 [5.37] [-0.70] [6.15] [5.73] 
Obs. 898 381 517  
Panel C: Non-Related-Party M&As (Non-RPMA) 
 Full Sample Before the SSSR After the SSSR Difference  
CAR [-1, +1] 1.21%*** 0.76%*** 1.34%*** 0.59%** 
 [7.42] [3.40] [6.69] [1.95] 
Obs. 1322 306 1016  
CAR [-2, +2]  1.46%*** 1.04%*** 1.59%*** 0.56% 
 [7.15] [3.85] [6.28] [1.51] 
Obs. 1322 306 1016  
Panel D: Difference in CAR Between Related & Non-Related M&As (After minus Before) 
 Full Sample Before the SSSR After the SSSR Difference  
CAR [-1, +1] -0.11% -0.83%*** 0.62%*** 1.45%*** 
 [-0.39] [-2.76] [2.65] [2.86] 
     
CAR [-2, +2]  0.13% -1.22%*** 1.31%**  2.53%*** 






Table 3: Mean difference tests on 5-day CARs by mutual fund shareholdings. 
This table reports the 5-day CARs for all acquirers around M&A deal announcements based on the level of mutual 
fund holding in the acquirers ie. if the acquirer has high mutual fund holding (High-fund) or low mutual fund holding 
(Low-fund). We measure High-fund (Low-fund) when acquirers’ mutual fund shareholding is above (below) its 
respective industry-mean. Panel A reports the average acquirer 5-day CAR values for the full sample, panel B reports 
the average 5-day CAR values for the acquiring firms before they successfully finished the split-share structure reform, 
panel C reports the average 5-day CAR values for the acquiring firms after they successfully finished the split-share 
structure reform, and panel D reports the triple difference-in-differences tests. Across all the four panels, we report 
the average 5-day CARs around the deal announcement date for the full sample (Full Sample), acquirers with High 
and Low Mutual Fund holding, and the ‘Difference’ between the two samples. We also divide the High-fund and 
Low-fund bidder 5-day CAR values across RPMA and Non-RPMA deals. We report the two-sample mean-
comparison test (T-statistics) in brackets. ***, **, * represents significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Panel A: Full Sample 
 Full Sample High-fund Low-fund Difference 
Related-Party M&A 1.60%*** 0.21% 2.34%*** 2.14%*** 
 [5.37] [0.49] [5.91] [3.73] 
Obs. 898 314 584  
Non-Related-Party M&A 1.46%*** 1.25%*** 1.53%*** 0.18% 
 [7.15] [4.82] [5.42] [0.44] 
Obs. 1322 507 815  
Difference 0.13% -1.15%** 0.81%* 1.96%*** 
 [0.37] [-2.3] [1.64] [2.81] 
Panel B: Before the SSSR 
 Full Sample High-fund Low-fund Difference 
Related-Party M&A -0.18% 0.01% -0.32% -0.34% 
 [-0.70] [0.03] [-1.06] [-0.63] 
Obs. 381 163 218  
Non-Related-Party M&A 1.04%*** 1.18%*** 0.93%*** -0.25% 
 [3.85] [2.7] [2.73] [-0.45] 
Obs. 306 127 179  
Difference -1.22%*** -1.17%* -1.26%*** -0.09%*** 
 [-3.26] [-1.87] [-2.75] [-2.73] 
Panel C: After the SSSR 
 Full Sample High-fund Low-fund Difference 
Related-Party M&A 2.90%*** 0.41% 3.93%*** 3.52%*** 
 [6.15] [0.58] [6.65] [3.80] 
Obs. 517 151 366  
Non-Related-Party M&A 1.59%*** 1.41%*** 1.70%*** 0.29% 
 [6.28] [4.08] [4.87] [0.59] 
Obs. 1016 380 636  
Difference 1.31%** -0.99% 2.23%*** 3.23%*** 
 [2.45] [-1.26] [3.25] [3.08] 
Panel D: Difference in 5-day CAR Between Before and After the SSSR (After minus Before) 
 Full Sample High-fund Low-fund Difference 
Related-Party M&A 3.09%*** 0.40% 4.26%*** 3.84%*** 
 [5.73] [0.47] [6.4] [3.6] 
     
Non-Related-Party M&A 0.56% 0.23% 0.77%* 0.54% 
 [1.51] [0.41] [1.58] [0.73] 
     
Difference 2.53%*** 0.17% 3.49%*** 3.32%*** 




Table 4. The impact of related-party M&A (RPMA) and the Split-Share Structure Reform (SSSR) on Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) of Chinese acquirers. 
In this table, we use difference-in-differences OLS regressions to examine the influence of RPMA and split-share structure reform on 
3-day and 5-day acquirers’ CARs around deal announcements. The key independent variables are RPMA, split-share structure reform 
and the interaction term of RPMA*SSSR. Model 1 and 4 show the basic results of difference-in-differencestests without controlling for 
firm level merger-related and governance-specific factors. Model 2 and 5 include the merger-related variables such as the log of the 
relative size of deal, payment method, state-owned bidder, listed target firms, and acquirer-firm characteristics including market 
capitalisation, market-to-book ratio, and ratio of non-operating cash flows to total sales revenues. Model 3 and 6 further control for 
governance-specific variables including excess leverage, excess control rights, the largest shareholding, mutual fund ownership, CEO 
and chairman duality, board size and board independence. The industry and year effects are controlled in all models. The numbers in 
the parenthesis are the robust t-statistics for the regression coefficients with standard errors clustered at firm-level. The definition of the 
variables is in Appendix A1. ***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable → Panel A: CAR [-1, +1] Panel B: CAR [-2, +2] 
Independent Variables ↓ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
RPMA -0.696*** -1.131** -1.889*** -1.075*** -1.738*** -2.999*** 
  (-4.63) (-2.56) (-4.46) (-6.15) (-3.44) (-5.03) 
SSSR 0.798 1.082** 2.166** 1.276* 0.198 1.097 
  (1.25) (2.27) (2.16) (1.92) (0.28) (0.72) 
RPMA*SSSR 1.261*** 1.215** 1.952*** 2.352*** 2.008*** 3.297*** 
  (5.34) (2.54) (3.20) (6.74) (3.68) (4.08) 
LOGRS   0.692*** 0.760***  0.854*** 0.917*** 
    (7.80) (7.08)  (5.36) (5.50) 
CASHPAY   -4.492*** -5.057***  -6.037*** -7.019*** 
    (-3.51) (-3.16)  (-4.75) (-5.17) 
STOCKPAY   1.641* 1.354  2.643** 1.889 
    (1.80) (1.15)  (2.60) (1.70) 
SOE   -0.037 -0.299  -0.105 -0.308 
    (-0.15) (-1.26)  (-0.31) (-1.02) 
TARGETLIST   3.208** 3.051*  4.158** 4.772** 
    (2.51) (1.89)  (2.37) (2.32) 
LOGMC   -0.205* -0.200*  -0.400*** -0.478*** 
    (-1.92) (-2.00)  (-4.44) (-4.12) 
M/B   -0.262*** -0.223***  -0.283** -0.244*** 
    (-3.17) (-4.38)  (-2.70) (-4.01) 
NOPCF/SALES   -0.011** -0.008**  -0.011 -0.010* 
    (-2.23) (-2.60)  (-1.66) (-1.79) 
EXLEV    -0.001   -0.005 
     (-0.09)   (-0.67) 
EXCON    0.006   0.002 
     (0.27)   (0.09) 
NO1SH    0.025*   0.011 
     (1.76)   (0.55) 
FUNDSH    0.014   0.024 
     (1.22)   (1.67) 
CEOD    0.438*   0.415 
     (1.99)   (1.36) 
BSIZE    -1.037*   -1.871** 
     (-1.85)   (-2.65) 
BIND    -0.022   -0.037 
     (-0.82)   (-1.07) 
Constant 1.712*** 8.783** 10.116** 1.922*** 15.821*** 22.350*** 
  (3.73) (2.40) (2.61) (4.10) (6.93) (6.81) 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2,220 1,608 1,400 2,220 1,608 1,400 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 0.155 0.179 0.030 0.174 0.197 
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Table 5: Sub-sample tests on the impact of related-party M&A (RPMA) and the Split-Share Structure Reform 
(SSSR) on Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Chinese acquirers. 
In this table, we repeat the regression analysis in Table 4 (model 6) using sub-samples of private controlled firms 
(POEs) and state-controlled firms (SOEs). We further divide all state-owned acquiring firms into central government 
controlled SOE (Central_SOE) bidders and local/provincial government controlled SOE (Local_SOEs) bidders. The 
industry and year effects are controlled in all models. The numbers in the parenthesis are the robust t-statistics for the 
regression coefficients with standard errors clustered at firm-level. The definition of the variables is in Appendix A1. 
***, **, * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable →  CAR [-2, +2] 
Sub-Sample Independent Variables ↓ (1) POE (2) SOE (3) Central SOE (4) Local SOE 
RPMA -2.039* -3.958*** -0.100 -5.640*** 
  (-1.88) (-4.98) (-0.05) (-5.18) 
SSSR 0.189 1.107 6.870*** 0.449 
  (0.23) (0.59) (5.04) (0.21) 
RPMA*SSSR 2.325** 4.183*** 1.456 6.403*** 
  (2.00) (4.78) (0.81) (4.49) 
LOGRS 1.161*** 0.577** -0.298 0.719** 
  (5.76) (2.44) (-1.17) (2.28) 
CASHPAY -8.939*** -1.834 0.544 -1.996 
  (-3.98) (-1.14) (0.41) (-1.20) 
STOCKPAY -0.157 7.222*** 14.589*** 5.684** 
  (-0.08) (3.15) (11.03) (2.56) 
TARGETLIST 6.375** 3.373 2.247 2.923 
  (2.35) (1.24) (0.69) (0.85) 
LOGMC -0.776*** -0.380 -1.396* -0.315 
  (-4.48) (-1.73) (-2.07) (-0.61) 
M/B -0.360*** -0.138 -0.956 -0.165* 
  (-4.00) (-1.49) (-0.97) (-2.03) 
NOPCF/SALES -0.015*** -0.006 0.061*** -0.015 
  (-3.20) (-0.70) (3.95) (-1.52) 
EXLEV -0.012 -0.005 0.037 -0.022 
  (-1.05) (-0.42) (0.81) (-1.61) 
EXCON 0.025 -0.049 -0.187*** -0.005 
  (0.72) (-1.50) (-4.12) (-0.10) 
NO1SH 0.027 -0.002 0.059 -0.010 
  (1.27) (-0.08) (0.78) (-0.40) 
FUNDSH 0.017 0.036** 0.027 0.044 
  (1.05) (2.35) (0.77) (1.74) 
CEOD 0.185 0.932 3.860 -0.151 
  (0.47) (0.84) (1.33) (-0.17) 
BSIZE -1.925* -2.489*** -3.175* -2.261 
  (-2.03) (-3.02) (-1.81) (-1.73) 
BIND -0.085* -0.010 0.023 -0.003 
  (-2.07) (-0.16) (0.28) (-0.04) 
Constant 32.950*** 15.774** 30.712** 15.151** 
  (5.26) (2.16) (2.24) (2.22) 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 770 630 159 471 




Table 6: The impact of acquirers’ mutual fund ownership, Related-Party M&A (RPMA) and the Split-Share Structure Reform 
(SSSR) on 5-day Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Chinese acquirers. 
In this table, we employ difference-in-differences OLS regressions to examine the influence of the mutual fund ownership, RPMA, and 
the split-share structure reform on 5-day acquirers’ CARs around deal announcements. For robustness, we use three different measures 
of mutual fund ownership: (1) mutual fund percentage ownership (FUNDSH), (2) a dummy variable for bidders with high mutual fund 
ownership above industry mean level (HFUND), and (3) the relative size of mutual fund shareholding to the shareholding of the largest 
shareholder in bidders (FUNDSH/NO1SH). We incorporate triple interactions RPMA*SSSR*FUNDSH in model 1, 
RPMA*SSSR*HFUND in model 2, and RPMA*SSSR*FUNDSH/NO1SH in model 3. In models 1 to 3, we run OLS regression of key 
independent variables on 5-day CARs by controlling for other merger-related variables such as the log of the relative size of deal, 
payment method, listed target firms, and firm characteristics including market capitalisation, market-to-book ratio, and ratio of non-
operating cash flows to total sales revenues, and governance-specific variables such as excess control rights, excess leverage, largest 
shareholding, CEO and chairman duality, board size and board independence. Model 4 and model 5 repeat model 1 regressions setting 
using sub-samples of SOEs and POEs, respectively. The industry and year effects are controlled in all models. The numbers in the 
parenthesis are the robust t-statistics for the regression coefficients with standard errors clustered at firm-level. The definition of the 
variables is in Appendix A1. ***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable CAR [-2, +2] 
Independent Variables ↓ (1) Full Sample (2) Full Sample (3) Full Sample (4) SOE (5) POE 
RPMA*SSSR*FUNDSH -0.154***    -0.117*** -0.217** 
  (-5.64)    (-3.28) (-2.46) 
RPMA*FUNDSH 0.077***    0.016 0.129 
  (3.52)    (0.46) (1.67) 
SSSR*FUNDSH 0.024    0.050** 0.052 
  (0.82)    (2.81) (0.52) 
FUNDSH 0.020    0.027 -0.019 
  (1.00)    (1.25) (-0.22) 
RPMA*SSSR*HFUND   -3.846**       
    (-2.38)       
RPMA*HFUND   2.346**       
    (2.16)       
SSSR*HFUND   2.032*       
    (1.90)       
HFUND   0.024       
    (0.03)       
RPMA*SSSR*FUNDSH/NO1SH    -4.437***     
     (-4.14)     
RPMA*FUNDSH/NO1    3.002***     
     (4.38)     
SSSR*FUNDSH/NO1    1.013     
     (1.41)     
FUNDSH/NO1    0.163     
     (0.30)     
RPMA*SSSR 4.413*** 4.986*** 4.153*** 5.149*** 3.920*** 
  (5.38) (7.61) (4.78) (5.72) (3.14) 
RPMA -3.452*** -3.902*** -3.452*** -4.011*** -2.876** 
  (-5.63) (-5.70) (-5.32) (-4.41) (-2.53) 
SSSR 0.709 -0.012 0.796 0.752 -0.558 
  (0.46) (-0.01) (0.55) (0.37) (-0.65) 
Constant 22.334*** 18.328*** 23.218*** 15.700** 32.704*** 
  (6.84) (3.34) (6.82) (2.15) (5.02) 
Firm level controls YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,400 1,400 1,400 630 770 





Appendix A1: Detailed description of variables used in the analysis. 
Variable names Variable description 
CAR (-1, +1)  Cumulative abnormal return calculated based on the market model within the 3-day event window (one 
day before and one day after the merger announcement date). 
CAR (-2, +2) Cumulative abnormal return calculated based on the market model within the 5-day event window (two 
days before and two days after the merger announcement date). 
SSSR A dummy variable equals to 1 once the acquiring firm completed split-share structure reform in the 
fiscal year prior to the merger deal announcement, otherwise 0. 
RPMA A dummy variable equals to 1 if the acquirer firm and the target firm are considered related-parties, 
otherwise 0 if not related. 
SSSR*RPMA Interaction item of the above two dummy variables, which equals to 1 for related-party mergers took 
place after the split-share structure reform, and 0 for all other cases. 
LOGRS  It equals to the natural logarithm of the ratio of the merger deal transaction value to acquirer’s market 
value in the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement. 
CASHPAY  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is paid by cash only, otherwise 0. 
STOCKPAY A dummy variable equal to 1 if the deal is paid by stocks only, otherwise 0. 
SOE  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the acquirer firm’s controlling shareholder is the Chinese government 
or a government agency, otherwise 0 if it is a private investor. 
TARGETLIST  A dummy variable equal to 1 if the target firm is listed on the stock market, otherwise 0. 
LOGMC  Natural logarithm of the bidder’s market capitalization in the fiscal year-end prior to the merger 
announcement. 
M/B It is the ratio of market value of a bidder to its book value in the fiscal year-end prior to the merger 
announcement. 
NOPCF/SALES  It is the ratio of bidder’s net operating free cash flows scaled by its total sales revenue in the fiscal year-
end prior to the merger announcement. 
EXLEV  Excess leverage is the ratio of the industry median-adjusted financial leverage (book value of bidder’s 
debt divided by its market capitalization) in the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement. 
EXCON  Controlling shareholders’ excess control rights which equals to the percentage control rights 
(CONRIGHT) minus their cash flow rights in the fiscal year-end prior to the merger announcement. 
Cash flow rights are measured by the sum of the products of the proportion of ownership along the 
control chains, and the control rights are measured by the minimum proportion of ownership along the 
control chains. 
NO1SH  It is the percentage shareholding of the largest shareholder in the acquiring firm at the fiscal year-end 
prior to the merger announcement. 
FUNDSH  It is the percentage of total mutual fund ownership in the acquiring firm in the financial year-end prior 
to the deal announcement. 
HFUND  A dummy variable which equals to 1 if the percentage of mutual fund shareholding (FUNDSH) in the 
acquiring firm is above its respective industry mean value, otherwise 0. 
CEOD  A dummy variable equal to 1 for the duality of CEO and Chairman in the acquiring firm, ie. if the CEO 
and the Chairman of the board is the same person, otherwise 0.  
BSIZE Board size is the natural logarithm of the total number of directors on board in the acquiring firm. 
BIND  Board independence is the ratio of the number of independent directors to the total number of directors 
on the board in the acquiring firm. 
ORECTA It is balance of acquirer’s “other receivables” scaled by its total assets (Jiang et al., 2010). 
RPSTA It is the total value of related-party sales scaled by total assets of the acquiring firm. 
STPT It is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if listed bidder’s share is designated as a special treatment 
(ST), particular transfer (PT), or *ST around the M&A announcement or in the financial year-end 
prior to the deal announcement, otherwise 0. 
LOSS It is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if return on equity of acquiring firm is below 0 at the fiscal 
year-end prior to the merger announcement, otherwise 0. 
SEO It is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the listed firm successfully announced seasonal equity 
offerings within the M&A announcement year or one year after the deal announcement, otherwise 0. 
RI It is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the listed firm successfully announced rights issue within the 
M&A announcement year or one year after, otherwise 0. 
GROUP It is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if bidders’ ultimate controlling shareholders have significant 
shareholding in no less than two other independent firms, otherwise 0. 
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Appendix A2: Descriptive statistics. 
 
This table shows summary statistics of all variables. We report the number of observations, average, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum values for all the variables used in this study. The detailed definition and 
description of the variables is in Appendix A1. All statistics are computed based on available data on the 2,220 M&A 
deals in our sample. 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
CAR(-1, +1) (%) 2,220 1.16 6.24 -15.82 22.96 
CAR(-2, +2) (%) 2,220 1.52 8.07 -20.66 33.36 
SSSR  2,220 0.69 0.46 0 1 
RPMA  2,220 0.4 0.49 0 1 
LOGRS 2,220 0.85 1.46 -2.24 5.19 
CASHPAY 2,220 0.9 0.3 0 1 
STOCKPAY 2,220 0.05 0.21 0 1 
SOE 2,216 0.54 0.49 0 1 
TARGETLIST 2,220 0.01 0.11 0 1 
LOGMC 2,220 22.01 1.08 19.06 26.99 
M/B 2,220 1.78 1.45 0.52 40.2 
NOPCF/SALES (%) 1,968 7.47 23.72 -110.44 85.5 
EXLEV (%) 1,968 1.82 18.91 -32.3 51.41 
EXCON (%) 1,681 5.93 8.26 0 29.92 
NO1SH (%) 1,968 38.12 15.81 9.09 75 
FUNDSH (%) 2,220 8.31 13.38 0 58.35 
HFUND 2,220 0.37 0.48 0 1 
FUNDSH/NO1SH (%) 1,968 0.28 0.55 0 6.42 
CEOD 1,608 0.21 0.41 0 1 
BSIZE 2,130 2.19 0.22 1.39 2.94 
BIND (%) 2,129 31.24 12.82 0 66.67 
ORECTA 2,058 0.03 0.05 0 0.28 
RPSTA 2,058 0.02 0.06 0 0.39 
STPT 2,219 0.04 0.21 0 1 
LOSS 2,220 0.07 0.25 0 1 
SEO 2,220 0.21 0.41 0 1 
RI 2,220 0.04 0.19 0 1 





Appendix A3: Robustness tests on group-affiliated and non-affiliated acquirers. 
 
Dependent Variable:  CAR [-2, +2] CAR [-2, +2] 














RPMA*SSSR*GROUP -5.760**   -5.122**   
  (-2.56)   (-2.21)   
RPMA*GROUP 3.827   3.242   
  (1.74)   (1.44)   
SSSR*GROUP 4.029**   3.884**   
  (2.26)   (2.19)   
GROUP -3.220*   -3.100*   
  (-1.79)   (-1.73)   
RPMA*SSSR  8.295*** 2.803*** 12.021** 8.860*** 3.815*** 13.685** 
  (2.94) (3.40) (2.29) (2.97) (4.14) (2.23) 
RPMA -6.749** -3.275*** -10.830* -6.820** -3.892*** -11.101 
  (-2.57) (-4.96) (-1.91) (-2.51) (-6.06) (-1.74) 
SSSR  -2.520 0.644 0.268 -2.873* 0.175 -0.171 
  (-1.69) (0.47) (0.19) (-2.01) (0.12) (-0.12) 
RPMA*SSSR*FUNDSH    -0.162*** -0.139*** 0.152 
     (-4.76) (-3.23) (0.19) 
RPMA*FUNDSH    0.095*** 0.093*** -0.430 
     (3.80) (3.56) (-0.48) 
SSSR*FUNDSH    0.027 0.031 0.349 
     (0.90) (1.08) (1.71) 
FUNDSH 0.024* 0.038*** 0.020 0.014 0.021 -0.294 
  (1.84) (4.90) (0.84) (0.72) (1.03) (-1.51) 
Constant 27.219*** 19.828*** 40.260*** 27.370*** 20.158*** 41.246*** 
  (7.56) (4.24) (5.46) (7.38) (4.48) (5.49) 
Firm-Level Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Industry Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,397 935 462 1,397 935 462 
Adjusted R-squared 0.197 0.164 0.246 0.198 0.164 0.256 
The definition of the variables is in Appendix A1. 
***, **, * represent significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
 
